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Association Between Credit Rating Changes and 
High-Tech M&A in Taiwan*
Jo-Hui Chen^
Chung Yuan Christian University
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the impact of high-tech and 
non-high-tech mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on the credit rating changes in Taiwan. We 
utilized the ordered probit model with random effect for the empirical works. A variety of 
econometric tests were conducted using pooled data of 101 firms in Taiwan over the period 
Sep. 1996 to Dec. 2001. This paper tries to examine whether the financial and strategy 
factors affect the credit risks. Our results indicate that Insider Ownership and Leverage 
Ratio are negatively related to credit rating changes, while Return on Equity and High-tech 
Firm are positively related to credit rating changes for both pre- and post-M&A activities. 
Although higher Institutional Ownership increases in credit rating changes for pre-M&A, it 
decreases credit rating changes for post-M&A.
Introduction
During the 1990s, there were a number of changes in the competitive environment of 
the high-technology industry in Taiwan due to deregulation. After joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Taiwan’s high-technology firms face more severe competition from 
foreign competitors than from domestic ones. In particular, the foreign acquirers have 
introduced technological advances and know-how to business with the globally-accepted
The author acknowledges a grant from the National Science Council of Taiwan R.O.C. (NSC 91- 2416- h- 
033- 007). All remaining errors are my responsibility.
 ^ Jo-Hui Chen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Business Administration at Chung Yuan 
Christian University (CYCU), Taiwan, R.O.C. After having granted tenure on a faculty, he had a leave and 
worked as a position of General Secretary in Taipei Bank for two years. He earned a PhD in Economics from 
Northern Illinois University (NIU), U.S.A. Dr. Chen was then bestowed Award for Outstanding Economics 
Research Scholar at NIU. He also received three Grants of Outstanding Economics Researcher from National 
Science Council of Taiwan, R.O.C. His disciplinary background is in the field of Public Finance, 
International Monetary, and Regional Economics. He currently teaches International Monetary, Finance 
Management, Merger and Acquisition, and Economics at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Dr. Chen 
has published refereed papers in Applied Economics, Journal of Foreign Exchange an International Finance, 
International Economics, Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, and The Asia Pacific Journal of 
Economics and Business, and other Chinese economic journals. Currently, his areas of research interest are 
International Investment, Merger and Acquisition, and International Public Finance.
practices and standards, that have successfully upgraded industrial restructuring, improved 
management performance, eliminated inefficient corporations, and contributed to efficiency 
gains, which helped the recovery of Asian economies from financial crisis. (Agami, 2002)
Technical innovation, technology transfer, and advanced information system have 
contributed to increase efficiency by introducing new economies of scale into the 
high-technology industry. To enrich profitability by providing more efficient service to 
customers and by increasing the shareholders’ wealth, frequent takeovers within the 
high-technology industry have been considered as one of the major strategies for reducing 
the number of competitors during the process of deregulation. To enhance market power 
and utilize tax credits, many high-tech firms participated in takeovers targeting on the firms 
whose assets are undervalued and have relatively low share prices. (Walker, 2000) As a 
result, takeovers in related industry may facilitate the efficient redeployment of assets and 
improve the operation performance of targeting firms in resolving financial distress. 
(Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998)
However, high-tech targets associated with the inherent uncertainty of future 
outcomes and the unproven nature of technological innovation may produce higher 
likelihood of valuation risk for the acquirers than in the other takeover activities. The 
acquirers tend to be suspicious about whether the benefits of value creation in this high-risk 
acquisition can help them obtain a steady growth and offset the destructive impacts. To 
reduce the skepticism of high-tech acquisitions, the acquirers needed to measure 
continuously relative credit risk under an affordable cost. The credit rating agencies can 
provide such accurate rank-orderings of the default risks in the credit evaluation process to 
define investment prohibitions, to determine default probabilities, and to assist the acquirers 
in assorting more carefully among targets. (Cantor and Packer, 1994) However, the major 
determinants with respect to the empirical link between the wealth of acquirers and the 
credit rating changes remain unknown.
This study aims to estimate the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the credit 
rating changes for high-tech and non-high-tech acquirers in Taiwan. We hypothesize the 
key determinants of pre- and post-M&A activities to increase the awareness of the acquirer’s 
ability to create value and reduce default risks, and to provide more detailed information to 
help investors distinguish more carefully among takeovers. We utilize the ordered probit 
model with random effect for the empirical works. A variety of econometric tests are 
conducted using a pooled data of cross-section and time-series for 101 firms of high-tech 
and non-high-tech acquisitions in Taiwan over the period Sept. 1996 to Dec. 2001. This 
study demonstrates the difference between high-tech and non-high-tech takeovers and 
provides some unique empirical results for examining how financial factors (such as Return 
on Equity, Cash Flow Return on Sales, Leverage Ratio, and Price-eamings Ratio) and 
strategy factors (such as Insider Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Market-to-book Ratio, 
and Industrial Relatedness) affect the credit rating changes.
The important findings of this study show that high-tech acquisitions are more likely 
to upgrade credit ratings than non-high-tech acquisitions. These results provide evidence 
that credit rating changes depend heavily on the presence of Return on Equity, Insider 
Ownership, and Leverage Ratio. While institutional investors play an important role in 
increasing credit ratings for pre-M&A due to a strong capacity of targeting firms to meet 
financial obligations, they found to decrease credit ratings because of pessimism of 
managerial performance and default risks for post-M&A. We also found an inverse 
relationship between Industrial Relatedness and credit ratings for post-M&A.
The evidence in this study sheds light on the determinants of the credit ratings for an 
accurate assessment to alleviate the credit risks involved in the high-tech and non-high-tech
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acquisitions. This paper provides valuable information not only to improve investment 
decisions for financial institutions and to reinforce the evaluation of loans for bankers, but 
also to enhance the acquirer’s performance in takeover activities.
Review of Existing Literature
In finance literature, a considerable volume of empirical studies on the wealth and 
managerial performance effects of mergers and acquisitions has generally used financial 
ratios analysis and abnormal returns to hypothesize whether there are gains available to the 
stockholders of the acquirers and targets. Previous research has found somewhat mixed 
results on the excess returns of the acquirers. According to the U.S. foreign acquisition 
announcement, Doukas and Travlos (1988) provided empirical evidence to show that the 
acquirers expanded a multinational network into a new industry across borders in order to 
reduce institutional restrictions and to spread out country risks efficiently. Hence, these 
acquirers may obtain greater value than those who have already operated in the target firm’s 
country. In support of this position, Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos (1992) found 
that foreign takeovers of the U.S. targets are likely to experience greater wealth gains than 
domestic takeovers of the U.S. targets especially for the high-technology sector. Consistent 
with the multinational-network hypothesis, Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) and Lyroudi, 
Lazaridis and Subeniotis (1999) confirmed that the acquirers earn positive abnormal returns 
by acquiring target firms in less developed countries and European countries. However, 
inconsistent with the multinational network hypothesis, Dunne and Ndubizu (1995) found 
that the acquirers operating in the U.S. market, who have an advantage of lower 
coordination and monitoring cost and higher the efficiency in internal contracting process, 
transfer more wealth to target shareholders than those already having a subsidiary in the U.S. 
market. Yook and McCabe (1996) used a sample of 68 U.S. firms engaged in international 
acquisitions to examine the wealth effects of acquiring firms’ shareholders. However, they 
find no evidence to support the multinational-network hypothesis.
Some researchers have examined the post-merge performance of acquirers. 
Regardless of the effects of pajonent method in cash or stock, Kohers and Kohers (2000) 
showed that the acquirers of high-tech targets often experienced significant positive 
abnormal returns to provide greater shareholder wealth benefits at the announcement date of 
high-tech takeovers. They indicated that the moderate level of managerial ownership of 
the acquirers, the larger size of transactions, and the lower institutional ownership of targets 
have a positive effect on acquirers’ returns. To be consistent with the inefficient 
management hypothesis, Palepu (1986) and Cudd and Duggal (2000) adjusted the financial 
ratios for industry-specific distribution and found that the return on equity and leverage ratio 
are negative and significant, suggesting that the shareholders’ wealth of the acquirers can be 
accumulated by disciplinary actions taken against the inefficient managers of targets prior to 
the acquisition. This conclusion was strengthened by the study of Ghosh and Lee (2000), 
who examined whether disciplinary or non-disciplinary acquisitions generated higher 
abnormal returns in terms of long-term earnings forecast revisions of target firms around 
acquisition announcement dates. The results showed that the acquirers were likely to pay a 
h i^  premium to obtain gains fi-om disciplinary actions when the managerial performance of 
targeting firms performed poorly. Kohers and Kohers (2001) also reported that the 
shareholders of acquirers respond favorably to high-tech takeover announcements in terms 
of the creation of their wealth, but the long-run post-merger performance of acquirers was 
poor if acquirers appeared to be related to a low book-to-market ratio, a low return on equity, 
and a small managerial ownership with a high potential of agency problems.
In addition to reviewing the acquirers’ wealth effects of takeovers, some studies also
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extend this framework for investigating the relationship between the wealth and the rating 
changes. Wansley, Elayan and Maris (1990), Goh and Ederington (1993) have examined 
the reaction of common stock returns and preferred stock returns for the credit quality 
placed on the rating agencies. They found a significant negative reaction to bond 
downgrades because the rating agency attributes a fall in firm value to a decrease in earnings, 
cash flow, or sales and by an increase in leverage, but no significant reaction to bond 
upgrades. Ederington and Goh (1998) supported this view and found Granger causality 
flows for both bond downgrades and earnings of the U.S. firms, but not for bond upgrades. 
They showed that bond downgrades altered by the rating agency in reflecting the firm’s 
financial difficulty tend to make financial analysts lower the firms’ earnings forecasts.
Lakshmi (1991) has used standard event study methodology to identify the impacts 
of the stock price reactions to the risk of industrial straight debts, measured by their bond 
ratings. Lakshmi found no evidence to show that the abnormal stock returns reaction of the 
announcements of investment-grade and non-investment-grade debts were significantly 
affected by the firms not involved in the takeovers. However, Billett (1996) and Goh and 
Ederington (1999) contended that firms with low-rated speculative debt might experience 
less likelihood of takeovers compared with those with an investment-grade debt because an 
increase in leverage weakened an attraction of a disciplinary takeover.
Despite previous research on the association between the wealth effects of takeovers 
and credit rating changes, factors influencing credit rating changes that are associated with 
the distinct high-growth/high-risk profile of high-tech takeovers remain to be studied.
Ordered Probit Analysis of Credit Rating Changes in the Process of Takeover
We begin by specifying ordered probit as the estimation method for capturing the 
relations between discrete-valued dependent variables and continuous-valued independent 
variables. It is to be noted that the ordered probit models for pooled data were first 
developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), and have been used in previous economics 
and finance studies of bond ratings (see Kamstra, Keenedy and Suan, 2001; Badu and 
Daniels, 1997; and Blume, Lim and McKinlay, 1998). The random effect estimates of both 
methods use maximum likelihood functions and asymptotic standard errors to estimate the 
model parameters that have essentially similar statistical characteristics. In principle, the 
ordered probit models are derived from the normal probability distribution. (Greene, 1993).
The original specification for the ordered probit models with the random effects used 
in this research took the following latent regression:
(1)
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where refers to an approximation of the unobserved measure of credit risk for the 
acquirers involved in high-tech or non-high-tech acquisition. It is to be noted that is a 
matrix of the independent variables for the acquirer i at time t and P' is a vector of the 
estimated coefficients, s  is the white-noise residual which is normalized to a meari of zero 
and variance of one, where the group specific term,c7, , is distributed as7V(o,cr  ^j. The 
following numerous values of the dependent variable are observed:
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Here, r is the unknown “threshold” parameter defined as the range of the observed 
dependent variable, , to be estimated along with parameter vector p  . represents an 
approximation of the unobserved variable for credit ratings, . We assume that there are J 
categories ordered from the lowest to the highest as 0<zi<z2<.....<zj-i. The probability
flmction ofl^  ^has the form:
Prob(Yu=O)=0(-P'xu), 
Proh(Yu=l)=0(zi-Pxu)- d>(-p'xtt), 
prob(Yit=2) = 0 (zr P  Xu)- 0(zi- /?' Xu),
(2)
(3)
(4)
Prob(Yu=J)=l-^(zj.i- P' Xu),
where 0  is the standard normal density.
(5)
Given the cross-section and time series of credit ratings, we estimate the ordered 
probit with the random effect model as follows:
RATING ,^ =a,+a^- PE, , + +a, • CASH. , + ■ ROE. , + a, • LEV. , + • INSIDER, , 
+ a, ■ INST, , + • MARKET, , + • RELATED, , + ' HIGH, , (6)
where refers to some unobserved measure of credit ratings. It is to be
noted that "^,, and^. are the white-noise residual and group specific term, respectively. The 
following six values of dependent variable of RATING,, are observed:
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0 if RATINGl,<B 
\ if B< RATlNGl < BB
2 if BB< RATlNGl ^
3 if BBB < RATING  ^< A
4 if A<RATINGl<AA
5 if RATING], > AA
Table 1 details the number of credit rating changes for the high-tech and the 
non-high-tech acquirers. We find the most notable differences between the two rating 
categories. Most of the credit rating changes ranging from AAA to A for the high-tech 
firms were superior to those ranging from A to BB for the non-high-tech firms. The recent 
history of credit rating changes for high-tech and non-high-tech acquirers is shown in Table
2. Generally, the high-tech acquirers had a rating of BBB or higher, whereas the 
non-high-tech acquirers were mostly in the range of BBB or lower. The high-tech 
acquirers including United Microelectronics, Acer, Inventec, TSMC, Chroma Ate, Yageo, 
ASE, Winbond, and Mosel Vitelic, and the non-high-tech acquirers such as WUS have 
received the highest ratings (i.e., AAA) since 1996 (3Q). These firms were downgraded to 
lower levels in the following quarters except for TSMC. However, the non-high-tech 
acquirers such as Ruentex have received the lowest ratings. Ruentex experienced a 
downward grading from BB to CCC during 1999 (3Q) to 2000 (4Q), the lowest rating ever 
assigned to listed firms by Taiwan Corporate Credit Risks Index (TCRI). Lian Chen has 
even declared bankruptcy due to its financial distress since 1999 (3Q).
Data
We selected our initial sample of 101 acquirers involving both domestic and foreign 
mergers and acquisitions occurring between Sep. 1996 and Dec. 2001 as reported from 
Economic Daily News in Taiwan.^  According to the special high-tech classification codes 
provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), high-tech sectors included areas in 
biotechnology, information technology, semi-conductor, communications, environmental 
equipment, machinery, and pharmaceuticals, among others. Using the pooled quarterly 
dataset, we separated high-tech and non-high-tech acquirers with the credit ratings in terms 
of the effects of pre- and post-merger and acquisition activities.
Table 3 presents the definitions of the entire set of Taiwan Corporate Credit Risks 
Index (TCRI) created by Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) in comparison with the credit 
ratings of Standard & Poor (S&P) and Moody’s rating agencies. The proportions of credit 
ratings in the seven categories (i.e. AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC by S&P and Aaa, 
Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and C by Moody’s) are approximately the same. TEJ combined the 
numerous credit risk indices into three major categories, investment-grade with lower risk 
rating (1-4 degrees), medium risk rating (5-6 degrees), and speculative-grade with higher 
risk rating (7-9 degrees). However, as a further check, the exact proportions of credit
 ^ We excluded 56 unlisted firms because the data were not available on the Taiwan Stock Exchange database, 
and ruled out 16 listed firms due to the lack of credit ratings announced by Taiwan Economic Journal.
ratings by TCRI according to the classification scheme used by TEJ has a sHght difference in 
two categories of BB and B by S&P and Ba and B by Moody’s. The degree in credit rating 
in these two categories can be expanded further to become four sub-categories in order to 
match the different levels of descending financial performance or losses experienced by the 
firms.
The definition and notation of credit ratings as the dependant variable are obtained 
for each acquirer where data available fi-om TEJ are detailed in Table 4. To match the 
classification scheme employed by S&P, we combined the degrees of 5 and 6 to BB level, 
and narrowed the degrees of 7 and 8 to BBB level of the credit rating categories, RATINQ 
for high-tech and non-high-tech takeovers. We defined the threshold values ranging from 0 
to 5 in order to symbolize an ascending rating of B or below, BB, BBB, A, AA, and AAA, 
respectively. On the basis of relevant literature, the data for the independent variables 
grouped into two categories—financial factors and strategy factors, were taken fi’om TEJ 
database to study how the credit ratings were influenced.
The first category reflects the financial factors including Leverage Ratio (LEV), 
Cash Flow Returns on Sales (CASH), Return on Equity (ROE), and Price-eamings Ratio 
(PE). An increase in PE of the acquirer may enhance wealth gains from the acquisition of 
lower PE targets. Hence, the market tended to reevaluate the combined firms’ value 
according to the acquirer’s original high PE ratio, thus leading to a lower default risk (Cudd 
and Duggal, 2000). Therefore, one may expect a positive relationship between PE and 
credit ratings.
It is hypothesized that CASH has an important effect on credit quality. When 
CASH increases, the credit ratings may be upgraded because the amount of operating cash 
flow available to the acquirers accelerates business expansions. This may encourage 
takeovers and improve the acquirers’ operation performance to strengthen their financial 
conditions (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998). We expect CASH to be positively related to 
the credit ratings for the acquirers involved in high-tech and non-high-tech acquisitions.
We employ ROE to capture the effect of the acquirer’s long-run performance for 
high-tech and non-high-tech acquisitions on the credit risk. Kohers and Kohers (2000) 
found that ROE seems to have a relatively strong impact on high-tech acquirers in 
reinforcing market’s confidence with respect to the acquirer’s ability to create wealth gains 
in the high-risk deals. Thus, the higher ROE as a managerial entrenchment motive is 
expected to increase the credit rating.
Palepu (1986) and Song and Walkling (1993) found a negative relationship between 
financial leverage and takeover likelihood that suffered a decline in value. These findings 
are consistent with our view that the larger the acquirer’s LEV, the greater the market’s 
concerns on the acquirer’s ability to fiilfill its financial obligations corresponding to a higher 
risk of default through the downgrade of credit rating.
The second category reflects strategy factors consisting of Insider Ownership 
(INSIDER), Institutional Ownership (INST), Market-to-book Ratio (MARKET), and the 
Industrial Relatedness (RELATED) of the acquisition. To examine the role played by the 
agency problem in the high-tech and non-high-tech takeovers, we assumed that INSIDER 
which proxied for management quality, equals to 1 if the total insider ownership exceeds 15 
percent, and 0 otherwise.  ^ Song and Walkling (1993) and Kohers and Kohers (2000) 
revealed that increasing management quality has an effect on the acquirer’s abnormal returns 
at the high-tech merger announcement date in alleviating agency problem when managers 
are in alignment with owners of the company. Additionally, Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994)
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 ^ See Yook and McCabe, 1996.
suggested that increased managerial ownership, as an agency-conflict-mitigating device, was 
more prone to reduce the role of debt in order to minimize capital structure risks. Thus, we 
expect that an increasing Insider Ownership can be positively related to credit ratings 
because less agency problem signaling better quality management may improve the firm’s 
financial prospects and lower default risks.
A dummy variable for INST is expected to be a major determinant of credit rating 
changes for takeovers. Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994) and Cebenoyan, Cooperman and 
Register (1999) recognized that institutional investors have played a significant role as 
external effective monitors and have made proxy fights to restrain management behavior of 
myopic managers. With higher levels of INST and better external monitoring, the 
“Prudent-man Hypothesis”, firms may experience less debt leverage associated with lower 
level of default risk.^  Thus, the acquirers with the existence of a greater INST are expected 
to have upgraded credit rating because of a strong capacity to meet their financial 
commitments.
We utilize MARKET to be a proxy for measuring the presence of asymmetric 
information of the acquirers. If the acquirer experiences a high MARKET, it may reflect a 
high potential of asymmetric information related to favorable future earnings opportunities 
according to the market-to-book hypothesis (Emery and Switzer, 1999). To generate the 
wealth for shareholders and increase the firm’s credit quality, managers, who own a large 
proportion of the acquirer’s shares, may be motivated by a realized growth opportunities and 
an enhanced managerial performance."  ^ Hence, one may expect a positive relationship 
between MARKET and credit ratings. Another factor influencing the acquirer’s strategy is 
industrial relatedness of the acquisition. Doukas and Travlos (1988) found that 
multinational firms expanded into the unrelated industries at new foreign locations may 
experience a high wealth gain for their shareholders. However, to determine the value of 
an acquisition, Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) found that Industrial Relatedness to the 
acquirer’s core business is positively associated with its abnormal returns. We included 
Industrial Relatedness, RELATED, as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and 
target have the same two-digit SIC, and 0 otherwise. Our reasoning is that industrial 
relatedness as a measure of synergistic gains reduces credit risks when there is a close 
relationship between the acquirers and targets.
In addition to the financial and strategy factors, Kohers and Kohers (2000) and Ang
(2000) examined the role of high-tech acquirers in affecting shareholders’ wealth and 
choosing payment contract. They found that the abnormal returns and the tendency to 
select deferred payment would be higher for high-tech acquirers than for non-high-tech 
acquirers. The hypothesis is that, regardless of the inherent uncertainty of cash flow and 
technological innovation, if the market recognizes the potential synergies of high-tech 
takeovers as a means to increase growth potential, enhance technological advancements, 
offer job growth creation, provide efficiency gains, and improved shareholder’s wealth, the 
credit rating should be viewed positively by the rating agency.
E m p irica l R esu lts
The results obtained by the ordered probit with random effect model for examining 
the determinants of pre- and post-M&A activities are shown in Table 5. As can be seen.
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 ^ To obtain a better monitoring of management performance, Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1999) 
developed the Prudent-man Hypothesis to predict a negative relation between institutional investor ownership 
and risk measures.
Walkling (2000) used the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the Tobin’s q ratio to measure managerial 
performance.
there are three columns for the obtained estimates. The credit rating changes for M&A 
activities are in columns (I), while the estimated results used to analyze pre-M&A and 
post-M&A activities are detailed in column (II) and (III), respectively. To test the overall 
explanatory power of the model, we performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test to examine the 
group specific heterogeneity in Table 5. The LR test of the null hypothesis of a fixed 
constant in the probability function versus the alternative hypothesis of a random draw from 
the normal distribution yielded statistics of 249.106, 332.838, and 315.308 for the three 
columns. The critical value of the statistic is;jf^(0.01,l) = 6.64, indicating that we reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the random effect for the estimations. The fmdings for the 
threshold values, as shown by BB-BBB, BBB-A, A-AA, and AA-AAA, are all strongly 
sigmficant, indicating that categorizing credit ratings with uneven spacing intervals are 
evidently appropriate and defmable.
To start with, the results of the statistical significance of the determinants explaining 
the probability of credit rating changes for both pre-M&A and post-M&A are unique. Our 
findings suggest that Taiwanese high-tech acquirers wishing to preserve their credit ratings 
should seek to acquire firms v^th fmancial and strategy factors. We found that the 
coefficients relating to LEV, ROE and High-Tech (HIGH) are significant in all three 
columns. The results support the view that a higher ROE and a lower LEV are likely to 
increase the probability of higher credit ratings. This finding suggests that ROE, which 
represents a managerial entrenchment motive, would create an anticipation of the acquirer's 
ability to create greater wealth so as to increase the probability of upgrading credit ratings 
for both pre-M&A and post-M&A activities. On the other hand, a larger LEV viewed 
unfavorably in terms of greater debt burden corresponding to a higher default risk, is likely 
to downgrade credit ratings. Note that the negative impact of LEV on credit rating changes 
for post-M&A is greater than that for pre-M&A, suggesting that the market reacts worriedly 
about the acquirers suffering a change in financial burden via bridge loans and increasing 
operational costs after M&A.
In addition, the finding supports our expectation that the high-tech acquirers do 
receive relatively a greater probability to have a higher credit rating when compared v^th 
non-high-tech acquirers, as shown by HIGH, which is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level in all three columns. In particular, the results show that the distinct 
high-growth/high-risk profile of high-tech acquirers for post-M&A activity in column (El) 
are likely to obtain a significantly higher credit rating than for pre-M&A activity in column 
(H).
Unexpectedly, the estimates of the dummy variable, INSIDER, indicate a strong 
negative influence on the credit rating changes for both pre-M&A and post-M&A activities. 
This finding does not support the notion that, to alleviate agency problem, excessive 
management quality would minimize default risks and upgrade credit ratings. One reason 
may be that excessive managerial ownership may be associated with strong management 
entrenchment and augmented debt financing, and thus having adverse consequences for 
financial performance and negative impact on credit risks.
As for the effects of ownership structure, the result reveals a positive and statistically 
significant impact of INST on credit rating changes for pre-M&A activity in column (II). 
Moreover, Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994), Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register (1999), and 
Kohers and Kohers (2001) reported similar results. They noted that the greater the INST 
serving as an effective monitor, the lower the levels of firms’ debt leverage would be. As 
INST increases, the probability of poor acquisition decisions made by acquiring-firm 
managers may reduce. For the post-M&A activity in column (III), a negative and 
statistically significant relationship is evident. This echoes the earlier findings of Kohers
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and Kohers (2000), the negative coefficient for the dummy variable, INST, suggests that a 
higher INST is likely to be associated with lower credit rating for acquirers. Institutional 
investors tended to be skeptical about their assessments of takeover decisions and become 
dissatisfied with managerial performance due to the inherent uncertainty of technological 
innovations, cultural conflicts, the lack of cash flow, and less ability to reduce the debt 
leverage, contributing unique risks in financial distress.
The results strongly suggest that the Industrial Relatedness (RELATED) of the 
acquisition has a negative and statistically significant impact on the probability of credit 
rating changes in column (I). This implies an inverse relationship between synergistic 
gains and credit ratings. This is not surprising since the acquirers often overestimated the 
economies of scale or synergy gains of a merger and acquisition. These problems lead to 
the recognition that the acquirers may face weakening financial performance if targeting 
firms operate in the same two-digit SIC, thus increasing credit risks. (Burand, 1999)
We found that the financial variables such as MARKET, PE, and CASH show poor 
results. This suggests that for both pre-M&A and post-M&A activities, financial ratios are 
not important in explaining the probability of credit rating changes for high-tech and 
non-high-tech acquirers.
C on clusion
This paper investigates the determinants of credit rating changes for both pre-M&A 
and post-M&A activities. This study employs the ordered probit model with random 
effects to compare acquirers’ ability to create value for high-tech and non-high-tech 
acquisitions.
The results suggest that a higher ROE and a lower LEV are likely to increase the 
probability of higher credit ratings. The positive coefficient for HIGH supports the notion 
that acquirers are likely to receive higher credit ratings when compared with takeovers 
involving non-high-tech acquirers. However, high levels of management quality would not 
minimize default risks owing to the problems of strong management entrenchment and 
augmented debt financing.
The coefficient for INST is significant and positive for the ordered probit equation 
for pre-M&A activity, but significant and negative for the post-M&A activity. This 
suggests that institutional investors tended to be pessimistic about their assessments of 
takeover decisions and dissatisfied with managerial performance. This would result in 
greater fmancial default risk and downgraded credit ratings. We also found an inverse 
relationship between industrial relatedness and credit ratings because the acquirers often 
overestimated the economies of scale or synergy gains of M&A.
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Table I 
Credit Rating Changes
Rating High-Tech Acquirers Non-High-TechAcquirers All Acquirers
AAA 9 1 10
AA 7 5 12
A 9 8 17
BBB 7 10 17
BE 5 9 14
B 1 1 2
CCC 0 1 1
Total 38 35 73
Table II
Recent History of Credit Rating Changes
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High-Tech Acquirers
Company Products Ratings Effective Date
United Microelectronics Corp. Semiconductor AAA 1996 (3Q)
A 1999 (3Q)
AA 2000 (4Q)
Accton Technology Corp. Web Equipments A 1996 (3Q)
BB 1999 (3Q)
Acer Inc. Computer AAA 1996 (3Q)
AA 1999 (3Q)
Mitac International Corp. Computer BBB 1996 (3Q)
A 1999 (IQ)
Inventec Corp. Notebook Computer AAA 1996 (4Q)
AA 1998 (IQ)
TSMC Technology Corp. Semiconductor AAA 1996 (3Q)
Chroma Ate Inc. Testing Instruments AAA 1996 (4Q)
BBB 2000 (3Q)
Ritek Corp. Storage Media BBB 1996 (3Q)
A 1997 (4Q)
AA 1999 (3Q)
A 2000 (3Q)
Via Technologies Inc. Processors AA 1999 (IQ)
Yageo Corp. Passive Component AAA 1996 (4Q)
A 1999 (3Q)
ASE Inc. IC AAA 1996 (3Q)
AA 1999 (3Q)
Winbond Electronics Corp. IC AAA 1996 (3Q)
A 1997 (3Q)
BB 1997 (4Q)
BBB 1998 (3Q)
A 2000 (3Q)
Mosel Vitelic Inc. DRAM AAA 1996 (3Q)
A 1997 (3Q)
BBB 1997 (4Q)
BB 1998 (3Q)
B 1999 (3Q)
Solomon Technology Corp. Semiconductor BBB 1996 (4Q)
BB 1997 (4Q)
Orient Semiconductor Electronics Semiconductor AA 1996 (3Q)
Co. Ltd, BBB 1999 (IQ)
BB 1999 (30 )
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Table U 
(continued)
Non-High-Tech Acquires
Company Products Ratings Effective Date
WUS Group Holding Co., Ltd Electronics Parts AAA 1996 (3Q)
A 1999 (3Q)
BBB 2000 (3Q)
Ruentex Corp. Textile BB 1996 (3Q)
BBB 1997 (4Q)
BB 1999 (3Q)
B 2000 (IQ)
CCC 2000 (4Q)
Uni-President Enterprise Co. Food AA 1996 (3Q)
Taisun Enterprise Corp. Food BBB 1996 (3Q)
BB 1997 (2Q)
Yulon Motor Co., Ltd. Automobile BBB 1996 (3Q)
A 1997 (IQ)
AA 1997 (4Q)
Sanyo Textile Co. Textile BBB 1999 (IQ)
BB 1999 (3Q)
Hog Tai Electric Industrial Co., Electric Cable A 1996 (3Q)
Ltd. AA 1997 (3Q)
Lian Chen Food Co. Food BBB 1997 (2Q)
BB 1997 (4Q)
(a) 1999 (3Q)
Chung Hwa Pulp Corp. Pulp A 1996 (3Q)
BB 1997 (3Q)
BBB 2000 (3Q)
Potrans Electrical Corp. Electrical Products A 1998 (3Q)
BBB 1999 (3Q)
CMC Magnetics Corp. Storage Products BB 1996 (3Q)
BBB 1997 (3Q)
A 1997 (4Q)
BBB 1999 (3Q)
A 1999 (4Q)
China Synthetic Rubber Corp. Rubber AA 1996 (3Q)
A 1999 (IQ)
BB 1999 (4Q)
Pouchen Group Shoe AA 1996 (3Q)
Tait Marketing & Distribution Service BB 1998 (IQ)
Corp.
Note: (a) denoted “Bankruptcy”.
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Table III
The Definitions of Credit Ratings for Standard & Poor, Moody’s,
and TCRI Agencies.
Credit Ratings
Definitions
TCRI S&P Moody’s
1 AAA Aaa
Extremely strong capacity to meet its financial 
commitments.
2 AA Aa Very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments.
3 A A
Strong (Satisfactory) capacity to meet its financial 
commitments but is somewhat more susceptible to the 
adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic 
conditions than debt in higher-rated categories.
4 BBB Baa
Adequate capacity to meet its financial commitment, but 
adverse economic and financial conditions more likely to 
weaken capacity. Lowest Investment-grade rating.
5
BB Ba
Any debt rated BB for long-term (or B for short-term) or 
below is regarded as having significant speculative 
characteristics. Debt has less near-term vulnerability to 
default than other speculative issues. However, it faces 
major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse 
business, financial, or economic conditions that could lead 
to inadequate capacity.
6
7
B B
Greater vulnerability to default but still has the capacity to 
meet its financial commitments. Adverse business, 
financial, or economic conditions will likely impair 
capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments.8
9 CCC C
An obligor is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon 
favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to 
meet its financial commitments.
Source:
(1) Creditweek, Standard & Poor’s Service.
(2) Money Watching & Credit Rating, a Bi-Monthly Review, Taiwan Economic Journal.
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Table IV
List of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Notation Definition
Credit Rating RATING The credit risk index:
0 = B or below, 1 = BB, 2 = BBB, 3 = A, 
4=A A ,and5=A A A .
Price-eamings Ratio PE The PE ratio is the ratio of the acquirer’s market 
price per share to its earnings per share.
Cash Flow Return on 
Sales
CASH The pretax operating cash flow return on sales are 
measured as earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITDA) deflated by sales.
Return on Equity ROE ROE is earnings after tax as a proportion of the 
book value of equity.
Leverage Ratio LEV The Leverage Ratio is defined as the ratio of 
long-term debt to total equity.
Insider Ownership INSIDER INSIDER is a proxy variable for management 
quality that is 1 if total insider ownership exceeds 
15 percent, and 0 otherwise.
Listitutional Ownership INST A dummy variable for Institutional Ownership 
that is 1 if the percentage of equity held by 
institutional investors exceeds 20 percent, and 0 
otherwise.
Market-to-book Ratio MARKET The Market-to-book Ratio is calculated by the 
market value of common equity to the book value 
of common equity.
Lidustrial Relatedness RELATED The Industrial Relatedness of the acquisition 
equals to 1 if the acquirer and target have the 
same two-digit SIC and zero otherwise.
High-Tech Firm HIGH A dummy variable for high-tech firms. If 
HIGH= 1, the acquirer was from a high-tech 
industries; 0 otherwise.
Table V
Ordered Probit with Random Effect of Merger and Acquisition
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Regressor Notation
M&A Pre- M & A Post- M & A
I II III
Constant
Constant 3.351
(14.62)**
4.120
(11.54)**
3.870
(9.81)**
Price-eamings PE -0001 -0.001 -0.001
Ratio (-0.19) (-0.74) (-0.54)
Cash Flow CASH 0.056 0.088 0.140
Return on Sales (0.52) (0.57) (0.90)
Return on Equity ROE 0.016 0.020 0.021
(2.88)** (3.32)** (3.57)**
Leverage Ratio LEV -1.754 -2.412 -3.156
(-8.47)** (-8.32)** (-8.71)**
Insider Ownership INSIDER 0.336 -0.771 -0.738
(1.30) (-4.75)** (-4.19)**
Institutional INST -0.653 0.465 -0.662
Ownership (-2.95)** (2.91)** (-2.77)**
Market-to-book MARKET 0.004 0.006 0.007
Ratio (0.14) (0.22) (0.24)
Industrial Relatedness RELATED -0.895
(-10.52)**
-0.141
(-0.66)
High-Tech Firm HIGH 1.303 0.0783 2.162
1 (5.92)** (4.83)** (8.01)** 1
Thresholds
BB - BBB
2.143
(18.72)**
2.847
(14.13)**
2.806
(9.10)**
BBB-A
2.938
(21.22)**
3.715
(17.02)**
3.699
(11.63)**
A ‘ AA
3.704
(30.121)**
4.590
(21.35)**
4.620
(13.91)**
AA—AAA
5.212
(36.44)**
6.380
(26.48)**
6.430
(19.15)**
Measure o f Fit
Likelihood Ratio Test 249.106 332.838 315.308
Standard Deviation
1.135
(11.59)**
1.748
(17.34)**
1.366
(17.04)**
Note:
1. t-statistics is in Parentheses.
2. ** indicates significance at the 5 per cent levels o f  the two-tail test.
